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"Accordingly, it might be useful to consider ways in which some added discipline could
be imposed on the interbank market. Such discipline, in principle, could be imposed on
either debtor or creditor banks.  ... Alternatively, the issue of moral hazard in interbank
markets could be addressed by charging banks for the existence of the sovereign
guarantee, particularly in more vulnerable countries where that guarantee is more likely
to be called upon and whose cost might deter some aberrant borrowing. For example,
sovereigns could charge an explicit premium, or could impose reserve requirements,
earning low or even zero interest rates, on interbank liabilities.  Increasing the capital
charge on lending banks, instead of on borrowing banks, might also be effective."
    Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan, May 7, 1998.1
1. Introduction
The global financial market has been shaken throughout the nineties by a series of major
financial crises.  In retrospect, the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 was a mild tequila overhang in comparison
to the major Asian flu of the late nineties.  Attempts to stabilize the global system have led to massive
bailouts, the sizes of which seem to increase exponentially.2  This experience suggests that the present
system cannot survive indefinitely, as the willingness of tax payers in the OECD countries to engage in
continuing bailouts is approaching its limits.  Growing recognition of this has resulted in a spirited
debate among economists, and soul searching among policy makers.
At one end of the spectrum of views, we find believers in the inherent efficiency of private
financial intermediation, arguing that the crises are due to global moral hazard generated by quasi public
financial institutions and government interventions.  The provision of implicit (or explicit) insurance has
subsidized private lending at the expense of the tax payers.  According to this view, preventing these
crises requires alleviating the global moral hazard problem.  To accomplish this task may necessitate a
scaling down of the role of the IMF and that of other quasi public institutions in orchestrating bailouts.
                                                
1Before the 34th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago.
2The Mexican bailout required about $ 40 billion.  The recent crises in the Far East have triggered
commitments of the IMF and the OECD countries to South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand of about $
115 billion.3
At the other end of the spectrum are economists who argue for stringent capital controls, needed
in order to cut international lending to emerging markets.  According to this view, large capital flows are
destabilizing, and are frequently welfare reducing for both the emerging markets and the OECD
countries, potentially benefiting only the speculators.
In between these extremes exists a large array of views.  Most share the presumption that we deal
with a second-best situation, in which there is no quick fix but welfare can be enhanced by the proper
regulatory changes.  While prudent borrowing of emerging market economics is beneficial, excessive
borrowing may be disadvantageous due to existing distortions.  In such an environment, one should
either reduce the existing distortions, or induce borrowers and lenders to internalize them.  An example
of these views is provided by Chairman Alan Greenspan, in his remarks cited above, in which he
proposes the imposition of reserve requirements on foreign bank loans as a possible means of imposing
discipline on the market.
To put this issue in the broader context, we observe that most mainstream economists agree that
approaching free trade in goods and services is beneficial.  But such a consensus is lacking when we
deal with financial integration.  Indeed there is a spirited debate concerning the wisdom of unrestricted
capital mobility between the OECD and emerging markets, and various previous studies have identified
circumstances in which unlimited capital mobility may be sub-optimal.3
The notion of introducing reserve requirements as a means of stabilizing capital flows between
advanced and emerging markets is an innovative idea, one that merits serious analysis.  The novel aspect
of this paper is in applying a public finance framework to evaluate the general macroeconomic impact of
reserve requirements in a second-best world, where in the absence of credible pre-commitments, we
observe moral hazard on the lender's side, and sovereign risk on the borrower's side.  We are particularly
concerned with determining how the effects of bailouts interact with the reserve requirements and how
the optimal design of reserve requirements is impacted.
                                                
3See, for example, McKinnon (1982), Diaz-Alejandro (1984), Kletzer (1984), Aizenman (1989).  For
recent contributors, see McKinnon  and  Pill (1996), Krugman (1988), Rodrik (1998), Agénor and
Aizenman (1998), and Caballero and  Krishnamurthy (1998).4
An important objective of our analysis is to identify the welfare consequence of imposing a
country-specific reserve requirement, and to investigate in whose interest these regulations would work.
We consider costly financial intermediation between lenders and emerging markets in the presence of
sovereign risk.  Moral hazard is modeled on the lender side, due to the "Too-Big-to-Fail" doctrine --
large defaults of major banks are destabilizing, hence agents expect public bailout for large defaults.4
There is uncertainty regarding the default size that would trigger such a bailout, where larger defaults
are associated with higher probability of bailout.  While debtors may benefit from imposing a reserve
requirement on borrowed funds, the presence of moral hazard on the lender side reduces the borrower's
incentive to restrict borrowing.
Our results are summarized in a series of propositions that highlight the importance of reserve
requirements in determining the welfare effects of a more generous bailout.  Specifically, we shall show
that a more generous bailout, financed by the high income block, encourages borrowing and increases
the probability of default, thereby raising the expected yield to lenders.  In the absence of reserve
requirements, the associated higher bailout costs have a positive welfare effect on the borrowing country
but at the expense of the lending country.  The impact on overall world welfare depends upon whether
the net benefits of the higher lending exceed the higher monitoring costs, ultimately paid by the
borrowers.  At the same time we show that the introduction of a reserve requirement in either country
reduces the risk of default and raises the welfare of both the high income block and the emerging market
economies.  In these circumstances, the lender's optimal reserve requirement is shown to increase with
the expected bailout.  Such a policy induces the lender to internalize the expected tax payer cost of the
bailout.  Thus a more generous bailout that is accompanied by an optimal adjustment in the lender's
reserve requirements exactly neutralizes its effects on welfare, leaving welfare in both countries
unchanged.  The effect of a more generous bailout on the borrower's optimal reserve requirement is
ambiguous as are the welfare effects.  We also contrast the optimal choices of reserve requirements in
the two cases where the agents act non-cooperatively with the optimum chosen by a global planner,
                                                
4This doctrine goes back to the nineteenth century, when Bagehot identified circumstances where
systemic risk would induce the central bank to act as the  lender of last resort.  See Hughes and Mester
(1993) for a recent empirical evidence on the "Too-Big-to-Fail" doctrine is the U.S.   5
thereby enabling us to identify the impact of the externality on the policy choice.  Finally, we show that
the imposition of the reserve requirement may also improve the availability of information about the
debt exposure of the emerging market economies, which by itself will reduce the optimal reserve
requirement, and may prevent the drying up of the market for sovereign debt.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 outlines the model and identifies
the supply of debt and introduces reserve requirements.  Section 3 discusses the equilibrium borrowing
and lending and analyzes the effects of changes in reserve requirements and in more generous bailouts
on the equilibrium.  Section 4 analyzes the effects of these changes on the respective welfare of lenders
and borrowers, and characterizes the optimal reserve requirement from the perspective of the various
parties, on the assumption of a non-cooperative environment, in which each regulator designs the
optimal regulation from his perspective, taking the other's regulation as given.  Section 5 briefly
discusses the globally optimal choice of reserve requirements, while Section 6 identifies another
rationale for reserve requirements, namely as a mechanism for improving the transparency of borrower's
debt exposure.  Section 7 concludes.
2. The model
Consider a global economy consisting of two blocks, high-income countries and emerging
market economies, and assume a two-period planning horizon.  Agents in the high-income countries are
risk neutral, and their preferences are




where r  is the rate of time discount and coincides with the risk-free interest rate.  Agents in the








where we assume that their rate of time preference,  r
* > r, reflecting the fact that the real interest rate in
the emerging market economy is (substantially) higher than in the high income block.  Output in the
high-income and the emerging market blocks at time t is Yt,Yt
*, respectively, with Y t >>Yt
*. The only






where e  is governed by the probability density function  f (e), -e £ e £ e , e ³ 0.  All private agents are
price takers.
2.1 Borrowing Constraints and Reserve Requirements
The emerging markets block may borrow internationally, but its borrowing capacity is restricted
by the limited enforceability of international contracts.5  To simplify the analysis we consider the case
where the initial outstanding foreign debt is zero.  Suppose that the high income block lends an
aggregate amount  B1 in period 1 to the emerging market block at a contractual interest rate of r.  We
shall assume further that the lending agency is required to maintain a fraction q  of its loans as reserves
that yield a zero real interest rate.  Thus, with the reserve requirement, gross lending by the high income
block, B1, is associated with net lending to the emerging market of
B1
* º (1- q)B1,  (4)
as a fraction qB1 is lend to the central bank.  Hence the reserve requirement provides the fiscal
authorities with an interest-free loan, leading to second-period income of rqB1.
In period 2, the borrowing country is required to repay its net loan, B1
*, but because of the
stochastic output it may default partially.  Let S2 denote the debt repayment to foreign creditors in
period 2.  In the event of default, creditors are assumed to be able to penalize the borrowing country,
                                                
5See Eaton at. al. (1986), Chapter 6 in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for a review of the literature on
sovereign debt, and Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and Helpman (1989) for related models.7
reducing its net output by cY2
*.  The parameter c  reflects the bargaining power of foreign lenders,
indicating that up to a fraction c  of output can "confiscated" due to the threat of embargoes, etc.6
Consequently, the effective ceiling on net resource transfers to creditors is:
S2 = min[(1+ r)B1
*,cY2
*] (5)
Equation (5) implies that the productivity threshold leading to partial default, e
*
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For realized productivity below e
*
, partial default saves the borrower (at the expense of the lender) the
difference between the contractual repayment and the actual one.  We denote this gap -- the potential
bailout -- by b
b º (1+ r)B1
* - cY
*(1+ e) = cY
*(e
* - e) (7)
The international credit market is risk neutral, characterized by competition among banks that are fully
informed regarding the debt exposure of the country.  Partial default by the emerging markets requires
that banks should spend real resources m  in order to verify the productivity shock and to enforce the
repayment according to (5).7
Large defaults are potentially destabilizing, leading agents to expect the possibility of public
bailouts.  There is, however, uncertainty regarding the exact default size leading to the bailout.  We
                                                
6The term c  captures all the factors that may influence the integration of markets [like openness, trade
dependency, the state of the global economy, etc.].
7To simplify, we lump these costs together and we ignore the possibility of randomized monitoring [see
Towsend (1979) for a model where a debt contract is optimal in the presence of state verification costs].
As was shown by Boyd and Smith (1994), random monitoring adds significant complexity to the
financial contract, without generating first order welfare effects [see also Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
for a related analysis].8
summarize the bailout expectations in a reduced form equation, where the bailout probability f
increases with the default size:
f =f(b), where f(0) = ¢  f (0) = 0;   ¢  f (b)> 0 for b > 0             (8)
In the event of a bailout, the tax payer would compensate fully the lenders for the revenue shortfall
induced by default, b. 8  Hence, with the bailout, the bank's income on the foreign loan B1
* is
b + cY
*(1+ e), which equals the contractual repayment, B1
*(1+ r).
We assume that the partial default decision is centralized, being made and enforced by the policy
maker (like the Central Bank or the Treasury), who follows the default rule described by (6).  Suppose
that the policy maker in the emerging market imposes a borrower's reserve requirement q
*
 on borrowed
funds.  Although the aggregate borrowing of the emerging market block is B1
* = (1- q)B1, only
(1- q
*)B1
* is available to the private sector directly.  The remaining borrowed funds, q
*B1
*, are set aside
in a reserve account that is assumed to yield a zero real interest rate.  An agency of the central bank
borrows from the foreign banks B1
* = (1- q)B1, and intermediates the foreign loans to domestic
borrowers, charging a domestic interest rate r
*
, and imposes the borrower's reserve requirement.  This
agency collects the interest repayments in states of nature where no external default occur (i.e., when
e > e
* = (1+ r)B1
* cY
* -1).  In states of partial default, this agency collects the partial default
repayment, (1+ e
*)cY
*.  Any net revenue of this agency is reimbursed to the public in the merging
market in a lump-sum fashion.9  If there is no default, the loan repayment is financed by the domestic
interest rate, r
*
, in accordance with 1+ r = (1- q
*)(1+ r
*) +q
* ×1.  The borrower's reserve requirement
thus induces a wedge between the interest rate, r
*
, facing private agents in the emerging market, and the
contractual interest rate, r, charged by the lender on sovereign debt, summarized by the relationship:
r
*(1- q
*) = r (9)
                                                
8We can extend the analysis to account for partial bailouts, without modifying the key insights.
9Alternatively, taxes are imposed if the net revenue is negative.  In our example, the imposition of
reserve requirements on borrowing implies that the agency gets an interest-free loan, ending up with net
revenue.9
3.  Equilibrium Borrowing and Lending
The intertemporal pattern of consumption is determined by agents who maximize their
discounted expected utility.  The lender's risk neutrality implies that they offer an elastic supply of credit
at an expected yield equal to their time preference rate [see equation (1)].  Hence, the interest rate r is
determined by an arbitrage condition, equating the expected yield on foreign debt to the risk free interest
rate.  The former, given by the right hand side of (10) consists of the following components: (i) the
return on the loan in the absence of default; (ii) the return on the loan in the presence of default, which
equals the full return on the debt in the event of a bailout and the share of foreign output claimed in the
absence of a bailout, all less the enforcement costs; and (iii) the return of the reserve on the loan.
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Recalling (6) and (7) enables the right hand side of (10) to be written as:




Thus equations (10) and (10') imply that the financial spread is




Equation (11) is a fundamental financial equilibrium relationship in the model.  The risk premium
implied by (11) reflects the presence of default risk; in the absence of default risk, this equilibrium
condition implies r(1- q)= r.
Relationships such as (11) have been used to justify the presence of an upward sloping supply
curve of debt, facing developing countries.  Beginning with Bardhan (1967), several authors have
introduced reduced form relationships of the form r = r(B1),  ¢  r  > 0 to reflect foreign asset market10
imperfections into macro models of developing economies; see e.g. Bhandari, Haque, and Turnovsky






























where hf,b = dlnf dlnb is the elasticity of the bailout probability with respect to the bailout size.
The expected repayment of the emerging market on its external debt of B1
* is
(1+ r)B1
* f(e)de + cY
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From this expression we see that the bailout impacts in two ways on the budget of the borrowing
economy.  First, there are the expected intermediation costs m f(e)de
-e
e*
ò , paid directly by the lenders,
but passed on to the borrowers through the higher lending rate, r.  Offsetting this, the bailout subsidizes
borrowing by  bff(e)de
-e 
e*
ò .  This is also the expected net transfer from the tax payers in the high income
block to the banks (and indirectly to the borrower country).
Returning to (12) and (13), we see that w  represents the marginal impact of a larger bailout on
the net expected bailout costs to the borrowing country.  Combining these two equations we see that the
familiar assumption, dr dB1 > 0, holds if and only if:11
0 < f (e)de -w <




which under plausible conditions is likely to be met, and a condition that henceforth is assumed.10
The final component of the equilibrium in the world economy is the interest rate parity condition
in the borrowing country.  Being a price-taker, the agent in that economy views the interest rate and the
default threshold, e
*
, as exogenously given, determined by the corresponding aggregate variables.  The
agent in the emerging market determines his borrowing by maximizing his expected utility, where from
his point of view the interest rate is r
*
.  Given risk neutrality, the first order condition characterizing
optimal borrowing by the agent in the borrowing country is11
1+ r





The equilibrium interest rate in the borrowing country thus exceeds the rate of time preference there by
an amount that depends upon the probability of default.
                                                
10The critical default level, e
*
, increases with the level of external debt.  For a sufficiently low level of
such debt, e
* = -e , and (12) and (13') imply that the critical condition (14) for dr dB1 > 0 reduces to
mf (-e ) cY
* <1, a condition that is satisfied for a low enough but positive enforcement cost, m .  If
mf (-e ) cY
* >1, the supply of credit is backward bending at interest rates marginally above the risk-free
rate.  In these circumstances it would be in the interest of the borrower's central bank to prohibit
borrowing, rendering the problem being analyzed in this paper trivial.  Consequently, we assume
mf (-e ) cY
* <1, implying that the supply of credit is upward sloping at relatively low interest rates.  In
general, the external debt-borrowing rate relationship may include a backward bending portion, as will
be the case for high enough interest rate and external debt.  In these circumstance it would be in the
interest of the borrower's central bank to apply policies that would prevent reaching the backward
bending portion [a point on the backward bending portion of the supply of credit entails lower welfare
than the point where the external borrowing is maximized, see Aizenman (1989) for further discussion
of related issues].  Due to these considerations, we assume that we operate in the range where (14) is
satisfied.
11The expected welfare of a risk-neutral representative agent in the merging market block is
 Vi
* º Y1,i
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where  B 1,i
*  the foreign borrowing by agent i, and T1,i
*  and T2,i
* denote lump sum taxes.  the agent determines
his borrowing by maximizing his expected utility with respect to B 1,i
* .  The agent is price taker -- he
views the interest rate and the default threshold e
*
 as exogenously given, determined by the
corresponding aggregate variables.  The resultant first-order condition is (15).12
3.1 Effects of Reserve Requirements
The equilibrium in the world economy is summarized by the six relationships, (11), (6), (7), (15),
(4), and (9), repeated here for convenience:
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b = cY
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* º (1- q)B1,  (16e)
r
*(1- q
*) = r (16f)
These relationships determine the equilibrium solutions for gross lending, B1, net lending, B1
*, the
international contractual lending rate, r, the interest rate in the emerging market, r
*
, the threshold break-
even productivity shock (probability of default), e
*
, and the (stochastic) bailout, b, in terms of the
lending and borrowing reserve requirements, q,q
*
, and other aspects of the probability distribution
characterizing the bailout.
Substituting: (i) for r from (16b), for B1 from (16e), and for b from (16c) into the interest
arbitrage relationship for the lending country, (16a); and (ii) for r from (16b) and for r
*
 from (16f) into
the interest arbitrage relationship for the borrowing country, (16d), enables us to reduce the equilibrium
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* = 0 (17b)13
These conditions describe equilibrium in (i) the world lending market, and (ii) the internal financial
market in the emerging block, the solution to which jointly determines the values of (e
*,B1
*) for a given
pair of reserve requirements, (q,q
*) and the characteristics of the bailout.
From these relationships we see that the effects of changes of reserve requirements on (e
*,B1
*)
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In imposing the above signs, we are making two plausible assumptions --  D <0  and G >0 --
the rationale for which we now discuss.  First, both (18b) and D  contain the expression G.  To interpret
this quantity, consider the equilibrium condition (16d), the left hand side of which can be interpreted as





ò ].  It is readily established that the partial effect of a higher threshold break-even
productivity shock, e
*
, and therefore of a higher probability of default, on the mean cost of funds in the
borrowing economy is given by  ¶c ¶e
* ( )B1
*const = 1+r ( )G (1+ e
*)(1- q
*).  On the one hand higher e
*
raises the contractual lending rate, thereby raising r
*
, but it also raises the probability of default and
eventual bailout, thereby lowering borrowing costs .  It is plausible to assume that the former effect
dominates, so that G > 0, implying that higher default risk is associated with higher borrowing costs.14
Second, consider the term l º1+ r(1- q)- b(1- f)+ m ( ) B1 [ ]
-e 
e*
ò f (e)de , obtained from (16a).
This reflects the mean return on the loan to the lending country and consists of the loan rate net of the
reserve requirement less the net costs of partial default, inclusive of monitoring costs.  Analogously one
can show  ¶l ¶e
* ( )B1







û  (1+ e
*).   As long as the supply of debt is
upward sloping this is positive, implying that the higher default risk is also associated with a higher
mean return to the lending country.
The condition D < 0 can be expressed in the form
¶c ¶e
* ( )B 1 =const
(1+ r) (1- q







* ( )B1 =const
1+r-q
and intuitively asserts that an increase in default risk has a relatively greater impact on the borrowing
costs of the emerging economy than it does on the returns to lending of the high income block.  The pair
of inequalities  f(e)de > w
-e 
e 
ò , D < 0 impose restrictions on the marginal bailout costs to the borrowing
country, w , which we can express in the form:





















The inequalities in (20) can be transformed to upper and lower bounds on the monitoring costs m .12
In addition, we can establish:
                                                
12The condition D < 0  may appear to impose unrealistically high restrictions on monitoring costs.
Taking  q = q
* = 0 , the right hand inequality in (20) implies that the share of monitoring costs to the total
value of the claim [debt plus interest] exceeds (1+ r) (1+r
*).  Taking r = 0.02, r
* = 0.20  as representative
of real interest rates in advanced and developing economies, the cost ratio must exceed over 80%.  This,
however, is an artifact of the two period model we are employing.  If the model is applied to an infinite
horizon and the bailout applies to default on interest costs, the corresponding cost ratio reduces to r r
* ,
which is of the much more realistic order of 10%.  But despite this, our focus on two periods is justified
in that it preserves the character of the problem, and has the important advantage of permitting us to
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Conditions (18), (19), and (21) imply the following.  An increase in the reserve requirement
imposed by either the lending country or by the borrowing country reduces e
*
  and therefore decreases
the probability of default and reduces the contractual lending rate.  An increase in the reserve
requirement imposed by the emerging market leads to an unambiguous decrease in net foreign
borrowing.  Similarly, an increase in the reserve requirement imposed in the lending country reduces net
lending, B1
*, though gross lending, B1, could increase.
The final comparative static exercise of importance concerns the effect of a more generous
bailout.  We define a more generous bailout scheme as being an increase in the probability of bailing out
a given partial default, b.  A uniform increase in the generosity of the scheme is obtained by modifying
the probability of bailout by a shift parameter x , replacing the initial probability of bailout, f  with xf ,
where dx >0 .13  We can easily show that the effects of a more generous bailout, for given reserve
requirements, q,q
*

























ò > 0 (22b)
                                                
13We assume that, in the relevant range, xf <1.  Otherwise, the shift parameter replaces f  with
min[1,xf].16
Thus a more generous bailout will encourage more borrowing and raise the probability of default, doing
so by an amount that is proportional to the bailout itself.
4. Welfare Effects and Optimal Reserve Policy
We turn now to the consequences of alternative policies on the welfare of the representative
agents in the two country blocks.  We shall assess the welfare effects of the exogenous policy changes
(i.e. changes in q, q
*, and x ) analyzed in Section 3, as well as optimal policy and the determination of
the optimal reserve requirement from the perspective of the various parties.  We first analyze the effects
of a reserve requirement imposed on the lending nation and then study the impact of a reserve
requirement imposed on the borrower.  In analyzing optimal policy, we assume a non-cooperative
environment, in which each regulator designs the optimal regulation from his perspective, taking the
other's regulation as given.  This is eventually contrasted with the global optimal policy derived in
Section 5 below.
    We assume the presence of lump sum taxes, financing the net cost of the bailout.  The expected
net bailout cost to the treasury of the high income country is  bff(e)de - rqB 1 -e 
e*
ò .  The first term is the
expected bailout, the second term adjusts the cost by the government revenue from the risk free loan.
The expected utility of the high-income block, adjusted to reflect the lump sum taxes, is14
                                                
14In evaluating the expected utility of the representative agent, we consolidate the budget constraints of
the private sector with that of the public sector.  For simplicity of exposition, we assume that all taxes
and transfers are lump sum, and that the public sector demand for public goods is zero.  With these
assumption, the ultimate first-period consumption is the GNP minus external lending, Y1 -(1-q)B 1.
Similarly, the consolidated second-period consumption is the second-period GNP plus the expected
repayment on the external debt, net of the enforcement cost:
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ò .  Using (10), the second-period consumption can be
rewritten as  Y2 + (1+ r)B1 - qB1 - bff (e)de
-e
e*
ò .  hence, the expected utility is
:V =Y1 - (1- q)B 1 +
1
1 +r









ú , which is equivalent to (23).17
V(q,q
*,x) º Y1 - B1 +
1
1+ r
Y2 + (1+ r)B1 - bff (e)de -rqB1 -e 
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From (23) it is clear that the impact of a more generous bailout (dx > 0) or of an increase in a reserve
requirement imposed by either the lending country (q) or borrowing country (q
*) on the welfare of the
high-income block depends upon its impact on the expected bailout cost to the treasury
bff (e)de -rqB1 -e
e*
ò .
Turning to emerging market, we have shown in Section 3 above that the expected repayment of
the emerging market on external debt of B1
* is  1+r /(1 -q) { }B1
* + m - bf { }
-e 
e*
ò f(e)de  (see the
discussion preceding (14)).  In evaluating the expected utility of the representative agent in the emerging
economy, we consolidate the budget constraints of the private sector with that of the public sector.  For
simplicity of exposition, we assume that all taxes and transfers are lump sum, and that the public sector
demand for real goods is zero.  With these assumptions, the ultimate first-period consumption is the
GNP plus the borrowing.  Similarly, the consolidated second-period consumption is the second period
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Our welfare analysis entails focusing our attention on (23) and (24).18
4.1 Increase in Reserve Requirement in Lending Country
The effects of an increase in the reserve requirement in the lending country, q , on the level of
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We turn to the foreign spillover effect first.  Differentiating (25a) with respect to q , the impact on the

























where w, defined in (13'), is the marginal impact of a larger bailout on the net expected bailout costs to
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Condition (27a) brings out two conflicting factors in determining the effects of the higher reserve
requirement imposed by the lending economy on welfare in the borrowing country.  On the one hand, by
reducing default risk and lowering the world interest rate it raises welfare abroad.  But it also reduces net
foreign borrowing and thus lowers foreign consumption in the first period, and is welfare reducing.  In
the important case where there is no reserve requirement in the borrowing nation, q
* = 0, the first effect
dominates and welfare in the emerging country block is improved unambiguously.
Evaluating (25b), we see that the effect of a higher reserve requirement imposed in the lending
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where it will be recalled that hf,b º dlnf dlnb is the elasticity of the bailout probability with respect to
the bailout size.  The effects described by are ambiguous.  While the reduced probability of default has a
positive effect on welfare in the high income economy, this is offset by the lower borrowing.  Evaluating







> 0    (28)
We may summarize these results with
Proposition 1:  Starting from an initial situation of no reserve requirements, the
introduction of a reserve requirement by the lending country will raise welfare in both
economies.
The optimal reserve requirement for the lending country is obtained by setting ¶V ¶q = 0,
















This condition has a simple welfare interpretation -- the left hand side is the marginal benefit associated
with raising the extra taxes, paid indirectly by the borrower.  The right hand side is the marginal cost
associated with the increase in the resource transfers via the bailout.15
Substituting from (18a) and (18b) into (25b') the optimal reserve requirement for the lending can
be expressed conveniently in the form:
                                                
15We do have to be careful to ensure that there is a well-defined interior maximum.  This is not always
the case.  For example, if q
* = q = 0 , and the probability distribution  f (e) is uniform, the condition
¶V ¶q = 0 yields a minimum.  A well-defined interior maximum can be attained for other distributions,

























(recall that G º f (e)de - (1+ e
*) 1- q








û ).  Equation (29) determines the optimal
threshold break-even probability shock at which the expected tax payer cost of the bailouts is
minimized.  Given the chosen reserve requirement, q
*
, of the borrowing country, this then determines
the corresponding optimal reserve requirement in the lending economy.  Intuitively, (29) asserts that the
expected discounted revenue to the lender from the additional gross loan ((1+r)B 1
*), less the loss from
the expected cost of financial intermediation triggered by marginal gross lending, equals the discounted
increase in the mean loan costs abroad (c).16  In the absence of any reserve requirement imposed by the
borrowing country (q

















4.2 Increase in Reserve Requirement in Borrowing Country
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We see that in the absence of a reserve requirement in the lending country, q = 0, a higher reserve
requirement imposed by the borrowing block has a positive effect on welfare in the lending country.
This is because by reducing the probability of default, it reduces the expected bailout cost to the treasury
of the high income economy and thus has a positive welfare effect on that economy.
The effect of the higher reserve requirement imposed by the borrowing country on that country's
welfare is
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Using the inequality (20) one can establish that if q = 0 then ¶V
* ¶q
* >0.  We may thus state:
Proposition 2:  Starting from a situation where there are no reserve requirements, the
introduction of a reserve requirement by the borrowing country will raise welfare in both
economies.
Recalling the definition of w , the first order condition characterizing the optimal borrowing


















and in general yields an interior solution for the borrowing country's optimal reserve requirement.18
This condition has a simple welfare interpretation -- the left hand side is the marginal benefit associated
with policy induced increase in borrowing.  It increases with the expected bailout plus the difference
between the impatience of the emerging market (as measured by the subjective time discount factor r
*),
and the effective cost of funds borrowed from the high income country, r (1- q).  The right hand side
of (32) is the marginal cost associated with policy induced increase in borrowing, as measured by the
increase in the expected cost of financial intermediation triggered by marginal borrowing.  It is the
                                                
17One can show that an interior maximum can be attained under more general conditions than for the
lending country.  Specifically, it may obtain for a uniform distribution.
18In the case that r (1- q) > r
* >r , ¶V
* ¶q
* < 0.  Hence, the optimal reserve requirement in the borrowing
economy is to set q
* = 0.22
product of the cost of financial intermediation, m  times the increase in probability of partial defaults
triggered by the borrowing.














In general, the competitive equilibrium is inefficient.  It can be shown that in this case, optimal
borrowing from the emerging market's perspective calls for taxes on borrowing (or a corresponding
optimal requirement on borrowing).19  This result is in line with Aizenman (1989), where in a related
context is shown the presence of "congestion externality" associated with country risk -- the marginal
borrower ignores the impact of his borrowing on the interest rate (and indirectly on the prospect of
costly default) affecting all the other borrowers.
4.3 Welfare Effects of a Bailout
Consider now a more generous bailout as specified above by an increase in x .  For given reserve
requirements q,q
*
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While the direct costs of the higher bailout have an adverse effect on the welfare of the lending country,
the higher lending and the associated higher income from reserves are welfare-improving.
The impact on welfare in the borrowing country is:
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1+r,B
1
* = dln(1+ r) d ln B 1
*  is the interest rate elasticity
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Comparing the last two conditions, it is evident that for a given interest rate, the probability of default in
the competitive equilibrium exceeds the socially optimal probability of default.  Equivalently, the
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From the borrowing country's perspective, the bailout and the higher borrowing and consumption that it
permits are welfare-enhancing, while the increased default risk and the associated higher monitoring
costs (passed on as higher borrowing costs) have a negative effect.
Setting q = 0 in (33a) and q
* = 0 in (33b) we immediately see in the former case, and can
establish in the latter, that
Proposition 3a:  In the absence of reserve requirements, a more generous bailout reduces
the level of welfare in the lending country and enhances welfare in the borrowing
country.
Given that the bailout has opposite effects in the two economies, it is of interest to determine the impact
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Overall world welfare is impacted in two ways.  First, to the extent that the discount rate in the
borrowing country exceeds that in the lending country, the benefits of the higher lending rate to the
former exceed the costs to the latter.  Second, the higher monitoring costs associated with the increased
risk of default are a net welfare loss.  We may thus state:
Proposition 3b:  The net impact of a more generous bailout on world welfare depends
upon whether the net benefits of the higher lending exceed the higher monitoring costs
imposed on the borrowing nation.
The implication that a more generous bailout scheme has adverse effects on the lending economy
in the absence of reserve requirements is important.  It suggests that the introduction of reserve24
requirements by reducing default risk and discouraging borrowing, and thus ameliorating some of the
adverse effects of the bailout, may be an integral part of an international bailout scheme.  In particular,
we assess the effects of a more generous bailout under the assumptions that countries set their respective
reserve requirements optimally.  We begin first with the lender.
In this case see that the equilibrium conditions (16d), (16f) and the optimality condition (29)
jointly determine the equilibrium contractual lending rate, ˆ  r , interest rate in the emerging market,  ˆ  r 
*
and the threshold break-even productivity shock,  ˆ  e 
*, in terms of the given reserve requirement of the
borrowing country, q
*
.  The key observation from these relationships is that ˆ  r , ˆ  r 
*
, and  ˆ  e 
* are all
independent of the bailout costs, and are independent of x .  Given  ˆ  e 
* and ˆ  r , (16b) implies that the
reserve is adjusted so as to leave the net borrowing constant, i.e. ¶ (1- ˆ  q ) ˆ  B  1 [ ] ¶x = 0.  The equilibrium
relationships (16a) and (16b) then in turn imply:
¶ ˆ  q 
¶x
=
1- ˆ  q 




















Equation (35a) asserts that a given increase in the generosity of the bailout will increase the
lender's optimal reserve requirement.  The resultant increase is higher, the higher is the expected bailout.
On the lender's side, there is a trade-off between the optimal reserve requirement and the ability to pre-
commit for a no bailout policy.  The greater the credibility of such a policy, the lower is the needed
reserve requirement.
The effect of the more generous bailout on the respective welfare in the two countries, after
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Using the fact that   ˆ  e 


















Thus we see that the increase in the optimal reserve requirement and the increase in gross lending both
raise welfare in the lending country and reduce welfare in the borrowing country, doing so by amounts
that exactly offset the direct welfare effects of the more generous bailouts, leaving net welfare in each
economy unchanged.  We may summarize these important results with
Proposition 4:  A more generous bailout increases the lender's optimal reserve
requirement.  Given this optimal response, the direct welfare effects of the more generous
bailout are exactly neutralized, with welfare in both countries, and therefore world
welfare, remaining unchanged.
The results differ significantly if the optimal reserve requirement is set by the borrowing country.
The procedures are analogous and our results can be summarized.  In this case, the value of  ˆ  e 
* that
corresponds to the optimal reserve requirement set by the borrowing country is determined by the
borrower's optimality condition (32).  Given  ˆ  e 
*, (16d) and (16f), then determine ˆ  r   and ˆ  r 
*.  It is
straightforward to show from (32) that more generous bailouts will raise  ˆ  e 
* and thereby increase the
incidence of defaults, as they will increase the marginal benefits associated with borrowing and
stimulate borrowing.20  The rationale for this outcome is simple -- the higher borrowing is a mechanism
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* - r (1-q) ( ) [ ]f (e
*)+(1+ r
*)m ¢  f (e
*) cY
* .  Assuming that the
probability distribution function  f (e) is unimodal, and that the probability of default is relatively small
so that it lies to the left of the mode,  ¢  f  (e
*)> 0 then  ¶e
* ¶x ( )q*  opt > 0.  Taking the differentials of (16d) and
(16f) and substituting this expression for  ¶e
* ¶x ( )q* opt, we can show26
to induce greater income transfer in the form of bailouts, accomplished via more frequent defaults.  It
can be verified that the ultimate effect of more generous bailout on the optimal reserve requirement q
*
 is
ambiguous, as the increase in borrowing increases also the incidence of costly defaults with the payoff
of higher income transfer.
The effects on welfare in the two economies are obtained by substituting the expressions for
¶ˆ  e 
* ¶x ( )q* opt, ¶ ˆ  B  1
* ¶x ( )
q


















































































Bailout costs improve welfare in the borrowing country, but reduce it in the lending country.  By
encouraging borrowing, to the extent that the lending country has reserve requirements, this is welfare
improving.  Higher lending abroad improves foreign welfare, though the associated higher default risk
and higher monitoring costs offset that.  Furthermore, summing (38a) and (38b) the qualitative effect of
a higher bailout on world welfare, when the borrower sets his reserve requirement optimally satisfies
(34).  We can summarize our results with:
Proposition 5:  More generous bailouts financed by the high income block encourage
borrowing and increase the probability of default.  The effect of more generous bailouts
on the borrower's optimal reserve requirement is ambiguous.  In general, the welfare
effects in both economies and in the world economy are ambiguous.  However, welfare in
the lending country is adversely affected in the absence of a reserve requirement in that
economy.
                                                                                                                                                                        
 














































5. Global Optimal Reserve Policy
Suppose now that an international agency is charged with determining the optimal reserve
requirements for the two nations that will maximize world welfare, W º V + V
*
.  Setting ¶W ¶q
= ¶W ¶q












This condition asserts that the reserve requirement should be set such that the expected marginal benefits
of transferring the funds from the high income country to the low income country just equal the
expected cost of financial intermediation triggered by the borrowing.  This defines the globally optimal
degree of default risk, ˆ  e  s, say.  The fact that the optimal choice of q and q
*
 both lead to (39) implies
that one can be set arbitrarily (zero), while the other must be set to ensure that (39) is met.
The similarity between (39) and (32), the optimal reserve requirement chosen by the borrowing
country, acting non-cooperatively, is quite striking.  The borrowing economy adjusts the cost of funds
by the reserve requirements in the lending country, and in addition takes into account the benefits it
receives from the bailout.  Assuming (i) q = 0, and (ii) that the probability density function is unimodal,
with the risk e
*
 being relatively small, so that  ¢  f  (e
*)> 0,(32) implies that the optimal degree of default
risk chosen by the borrower exceeds the globally optimal level of risk,  ˆ  e  s.
The comparison with (29') the optimality condition for the lender acting non-cooperatively in the
absence of a borrower's reserve requirement is also interesting.  The lender too has an incentive to set
the degree of default risk that exceeds the socially optimal level,  ˆ  e  s, since by doing so he raises the
mean return on his loan.
The optimality condition (39) suggests another interesting parallel between the globally optimal
reserve requirement and that obtained when the lender optimizes non-cooperatively.  Equation (39)
implies that the globally optimal degree of default risk is independent of the generosity of the bailout, x .
It thus follows that the globally optimal reserve requirement and the corresponding degree of gross
                                                
21We can show that (39) always ensures an interior maximum.28
lending satisfies (35).  As a consequence these adjustments neutralize the direct effects of the bailout in
accordance with (37) and Proposition 4 applies to the socially optimal reserve requirement.  We may
summarize these results with
Proposition 6:  The impact of a more generous bailout on the equilibrium default risk e
*
is critically dependent upon the existence and determination of reserve requirements.  In
the absence of reserve requirements, or if they are set optimally by the borrowing nation,
acting non-cooperatively, more generous bailout will increase the equilibrium default
risk.  In contrast, if reserve requirements are set at their global optimum, or they are set
by the lending nation, acting non-cooperatively, more generous bailout will leave them
unchanged.
6. Reserve requirements and transparency of exposure
The rationale for imposing reserve regulations goes well beyond the arguments described thus
far.  One of the surprises of the crisis in the Far East has been the large information gap between the real
exposure of several countries to short term debt and the international bank's perception about this
exposure.  For example, the Economist commented on 11-Apr-98
"Thailand's secret sales of foreign-exchange reserves in the forward markets made a
mockery of its official reserve levels. No one had any idea how enormous South Korea's
short-term debt burden was. This opacity worsened the crisis, suggesting global markets
would work better if there were more information, of better quality, on a broader range of
economic items."
A chief achievement of a comprehensive reserve requirement may be improving the information
about the real exposure of the various countries.  To understand the desirability of such a system, we
turn now to evaluate the operation of the global financial market when there is uncertainty regarding the
emerging market's aggregate debt.  This will be the case if several lending banks compete without29
sharing the information about their exposure.22  To simplify exposition, we consider now the simplest
form of exposure uncertainty.  Suppose that actual debt is
B1(1- d)   with probability  0.5
B1(1+ d)   with probability  0.5
where d ³ 0.  Market participants have information only about the distribution and the expected value of
the debt, B1 The risk neutral market will price the debt such that on average, it breaks even.  Hence,
(1+ r)B1 = 0.5 (1+ r)B1(1- d) f (e)de + fl(1+ r)B1(1- d) + (1- fl)cY
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This condition can be conveniently rearranged to yield
(r - r)B1 = 0.5 (1- fh)cY
*(eh
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Proposition 7:  Greater noise regarding the aggregate debt tends to shift the supply of
funds facing the emerging market leftwards.
This may be established as follows.  Note that the right hand side of (40') is the average value of
the expected enforcement cost plus banks revenue losses due to partial default, for different values of the
total debt.  Under reasonable circumstances, this value is a concave function of the actual debt.23  The
                                                
22See Kletzer (1984) for a useful discussion in another context, identifying the implications of
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concavity of this term implies that greater volatility of the actual debt (as is the case if d  goes up), will
reduce the right hand side of (40'), implying a drop in the value of expected debt supported by a given
interest rate.  Figure 1 provides a vivid illustrating of this argument by plotting a simulation of the
dependency of the supply of credit on the exposure uncertainty.  The effect of uncertainty regarding the
aggregate debt is to shift the supply of credit inwards, reducing the elasticity of the supply of credit
facing the borrower.  In fact, it may dry up the market, as will be the case if we start with a significant
initial debt.  In these circumstances, the imposition of reserve requirement, and the public dissemination
of the total debt exposure of the emerging market economies will shift the supply of credit outwards,
increasing the elasticity of the supply of credit facing the borrower, and may even prevent the drying up
of the market.
These informational benefits are quite independent from the actual size of the reserve
requirement, as long as it is diligently recorded and disseminated to market participants.  Note, however,
that the compliance incentives of creditors may differ from those of the debtors, and one may argue that
due to time inconsistency considerations it may be preferable to impose such a requirement on the lender
side.  A side effect of improving the information about the aggregate exposure is to lower the optimal
reserve requirement -- the improve information would reduce the interest rate on a given debt level, and
would increase the credit supply responsiveness to the interest rate.  Both effects would reduce the
expected default, and tend to reduce the lender's optimal reserve requirements.
                                                                                                                                                                        
From the nature of the "too big to fail" hypothesis, one expects  2(fh ¢  ) + (fh ¢  ¢  )  (e





Hence, as long as the responsiveness of the bailout probability to the default size is large relative to the
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ò   is concave with respect to d .  The concavity of this term implies
that greater volatility of the actual debt (as is the case if d  goes up), will reduce the right hand side of
(40), leading to a drop in the value of expected debt supported by a given interest rate.31
7. Concluding remarks
Global financial markets have witnessed major instability in the 1990s.  As one possible means
to overcoming this problem, Chairman Alan Greenspan recently proposed the imposition of reserve
requirements on lenders and/or borrowers.  The rationale for the reserve requirements is provided by the
presence of various externalities.  On the lender side, the anticipation of bailouts introduces an
externality, where marginal lending impacts adversely the tax payer.  On the borrower side, as long as
partial defaults are costly, marginal borrowing affects all agents by increasing the probability of costly
default that would impact all.
This paper has conducted a rigorous analysis of reserve requirements on international financial
loans, analyzing their impact through the externalities on the respective welfare of the borrowing and
lending nations in the world economy.  Our analysis has suggested that the introduction of reserve
requirements by either borrowers or lenders will indeed impose the kind of discipline on the
international financial market envisaged by Chairman Greenspan.  Borrowing will decline, and so will
default risk, reducing the necessity for continuing bailouts.
The introduction of reserve requirements will improve welfare in both the lending and borrowing
economies.  But the design of the optimal reserve requirement in a decentralized world is a delicate
matter and both the optimal lender's reserve requirement and the optimal borrower's requirement have
both attractive and unattractive features.  The choice of an optimal reserve requirement from a lender's
standpoint may or may not yield an interior optimum, depending upon the nature of the probability
distribution determining the risk in the borrowing economy.  However, if an interior optimum exists, it
has the characteristic that the corresponding degree of default risk is independent of the generosity of the
bailout, just as is the case for the globally optimal reserve requirements.  On the other hand, while the
attainment of an interior optimal reserve requirement for the borrower is almost always ensured, it has
the undesirable characteristic that more generous bailouts are associated with higher degrees of default
risk.  The ultimate assessment of the desirability of the reserve requirement scheme rests on the
assessment of the credibility of "no bailout" policy.  As the record of the nineties suggests, we are far32
away from resolving these time inconsistency difficulties, suggesting that reserve requirement should be
considered seriously as a valuable policy option.33
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Simulated for the case where e  follows a uniform distribution, where
d = 0.4;Y* =1;r = 0.02; c = 0.3;m = 0.02;e = 0.4